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Abstract
Two studies examined how effort invested in a task shapes the affective predictions related to potential success in that task,
and the mechanism underlying this relationship. In Study 1, PhD students awaiting an editorial decision about a submitted
manuscript estimated the effort they had invested in preparing that manuscript for submission and how happy they would
feel if it were accepted. Subjective estimates of effort were positively related to participants’ anticipated happiness, an effect
mediated by the higher perceived quality of one’s work. In other words, the more effort one though having invested, the
happier one expected to feel if it were accepted, because one expected a higher quality manuscript. We replicated this
effect and its underlying mediation in Study 2, this time using an experimental manipulation of effort in the context of
creating an advertising slogan. Study 2 further showed that participants mistakenly thought their extra efforts invested in
the task had improved the quality of their work, while independent judges had found no objective differences in quality
between the outcomes of the high- and low-effort groups. We discuss the implications of the relationship between effort
and anticipated emotions and the conditions under which such relationship might be functional.
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Introduction
When we invest effort into something, most of us expect
material or emotional pay-offs. A long and thorough process of
preparing a journal article, for example, needs a true commitment
to research and, more often than not, some anticipated positive
emotions should that manuscript prevail the peer-review process.
But how do we predict our reactions to potential success? Until
recently, affective forecasts were commonly related to people’s
neglect of various important cues - e.g., their psychological immune
system, their past affective predictions, their representative
memories, or the temporal location of an event. Little is known,
however, about the cues people do rely upon when making
affective predictions.
This research examines whether effort, or task investment, serves as
a cue when people predict their actions’ hedonic consequences.
We predicted that more effort invested in a task would trigger
more positive anticipated emotions, should the task succeed. We
further predicted that this effect would be due to people’s heuristic
belief that their effortful actions lead to better outcomes (‘‘effort
heuristic’’). We are thus investigating a link between action cues
(effort) and affective predictions in an attempt to offer a new
insight into the causes of affective forecasting biases.
Affective predictions: A short summary
An extensive literature has investigated individuals’ affective
forecasting biases [1]. For example, people tend to overestimate
the impact of future events on their feelings (the impact bias, [2];
or the intensity bias, [3,4]) and expect to feel more enduring
emotions than the ones actually experienced (the durability bias,
[5]). These inaccurate judgments are due to multiple causes, such
as people’s tendency to think exclusively about the focal event
while failing to consider the consequences of other future events
(focalism, [6]), or to imagine the event as more powerful than it
actually is (misconstrual, [7]) and to ignore their ability to alleviate
the subjective experience of a negative affect (immune neglect,
[3,8]).
A small - but compelling - set of data has further documented
the way one’s actions are founded on the anticipated emotional
consequences of future events [9]. The enjoyment derived from
one’s current actions or anticipated from one’s future experiences
seem to play an important role in the way Western individuals, at
least, decide about engaging or not in these activities. Decisions
such as to become a psychologist vs. a business partner, to marry
vs. to divorce someone, to have a challenging vs. a relaxing holiday
are largely based on the prediction that one alternative will be
more (emotionally) rewarding than the other. In part, this happens
because anticipated emotions help us brace for the worst or
motivate us to initiate or to persist in goal achievement even when
faced with adverse conditions [2,8,10–13].
This body of research shows that anticipated emotions help
sustain effortful actions. In other words, affective forecasts may
shape task investment. What we don’t know much about, however,
is the reverse relationship: Does task investment shape affective
predictions? If so, why? We believe this topic is worth investigating
because the initial effort people are putting into a task might
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determine their affective predictions, which in turn could
modulate their motivation to sustain that task until the goal is
achieved.
Effort and affective predictions
Effort is rooted in people’s everyday life. We tend to expect
rewards to be proportional to our investment. Illustrating this
view, the ‘‘fair wage-effort hypothesis’’ and equity theory denote
that ‘‘the ratio of the perceived value of the ‘‘inputs’’ to the
perceived value of the ‘‘outcomes’’ would be equal’’ ([14], pp. 257;
[15]). We also tend to value effort and achievement through effort
and to experience more negative emotions in case of failure that
follows more effort [16]. As a consequence, we tend to reward
more the success and punish less the failure of those who we
believe have invested a lot of effort into a piece of work [17].
The same should be true when it comes to our own
performance and feelings. This is because we face events differing
in the amount of effort they require and this may create various
expectations about our affective reactions to them. In social
psychology, how effort influences judgment is a classic inquiry.
Effort influences the extent to which people feel overconfident
about realizing a task [13] or the extent to which they engage is
self-licensing and hedonic consumption [18]. Work on dissonance
and self-perception demonstrated long time ago that effort is
positively associated with evaluations of the outcomes of that
effort. For example, Aronson and Mills [19] showed that people’s
liking of a target increased following an unpleasant or effortful
experience with that target. The inconsistency between one’s effort
and one’s goal creates a state of dissonance that is reduced by
inflating the value of the outcomes of that effort. In line with this
idea, some authors suggested that effort inflates affective predic-
tions to better cope with the fact that one has invested a lot of
energy in that task [20].
We believe that effort may be an important cue people use when
making affective predictions. For example, people may anticipate
more intense emotions of gratitude or disappointment, for
example, if they perform door-to-door fundraising than online
fundraising, because the former is more effortful than the latter.
Nevertheless, people also differ in their willingness to invest effort,
or in their conscientiousness of fulfilling their tasks, so some of us
may spend a lot of time and effort in realizing their actions, while
others will only do the minimum to attain the same goal. But what
mechanism can explain the impact of effort on affective
predictions?
A recent, parsimonious extension of the effort justification thesis
stated that effort enhances the value of outcomes simply because it
is used as a cue for quality (the ‘effort heuristic’, [21]). In three
experiments, these authors reported that people provide higher
ratings of quality, value and liking for an outcome (e.g., a poem, a
painting, armors) they have thought it had required more effort to
produce. The important aspect of the ‘effort heuristic’ hypothesis is
that people seem to rely on effort because effort is a generally
reliable indicator of quality. Yet, the association between effort
and value is imperfect, so that the use of this heuristic can
occasionally leads to errors [22]. Our contention is that increased
efforts will generally boost up the anticipation of positive emotions
because people will expect positive results from their work (thus
equating effort with quality) and hence expect to feel good about
them. This is in line with decision affect theory [23], which shows
that utilities and expectations influence the predicted hedonic
consequences of our decisions. For example, when people expect
positive outcomes, they also tend to show more positive affective
reactions.
Therefore, we predicted (1) that more effort invested in a task
should result in more positive anticipated emotions (in case of
anticipated success), and (2) that this effect would be mediated by
quality assessments. Effort may influence people’s affective
predictions because it can give them an idea about how good
they should expect their outcomes to be. In turn, this expectation
should trigger feelings, such as happiness if one succeeds, or lack of
it, if one fails. Our first research objective is to identify whether
people rely on their subjective effort estimates to predict their
future affective reactions. Our second objective is to test whether
Kruger et al (2004)’s ‘effort heuristic’ mechanism can be one
possible explanation of why one would rely on his/her effort to
predict his/her happiness. Thus, in addition to Kruger et al.’s [21]
who investigated the impact of effort on other people’s performance, we
aim to show that the ‘effort heuristic’ might also concern one’s own
performance.
Overview of Current Research
The hypotheses above were tested in two studies, one with a
correlational (Study 1) and one with an experimental design (Study
2). In Study 1, PhD students awaiting an editorial decision for a
submitted manuscript estimated the effort they had invested in
preparing that manuscript and how happy they would be if it were
accepted for publication. In Study 2, participants produced an
advertising slogan in high (vs. low) effort experimental conditions
and then predicted their affective reactions if their slogan won an
advertising contest. Study 2 also included an objective measure of
outcome quality and contrasted it to participants’ subjective
estimates about the quality of their work.
Ethics Statement
Both Study 1 and Study 2 have received approval from Swansea
University’s Department of Psychology’ Research Ethics Com-
mittee prior to any data collection. Study 1 data were collected
online, using SurveyMonkey. For this study, consent form was
obtained by asking participants to click ‘‘yes’’ if they agreed with
all of the following statements: (1) I confirm that I have read and
understood the information above; (2) I understand that my
participation is voluntary and that, prior to completion of the
study questions, I am free to withdraw at any time, without having
to give a reason; (3) I confirm that I am over 18 years of age; (4) I
agree to take part in the research. Those who disagreed with one
or more of the previous statements were instructed to click ‘‘no’’
and they exited the survey. Study 2 data were collected in public
places, and participants signed a written consent form prior to
taking part. Their signed consent forms were not linked to
participants’ data in any way and were stored separately from the
data.
In both Study 1 and 2 we collected data referring to
participants’ age and gender in order to characterize the
participant sample. However, as we did not have any a priori
hypotheses about age and/or gender roles within our predictions,
these will not be part of the analyses reported in the Results
sections of Study 1 and Study 2.
Study 1
We first sought to establish whether there is a positive
relationship between the amount of effort one has invested in a
task (e.g., preparing a scientific article for submission in a peer-
reviewed journal) and the affective prediction regarding that task
(e.g., how happy would one be if that article were accepted). We
also tested whether the perceived quality of the article mediated
the relationship between effort and affective prediction.
Effort and Affective Predictions
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Methods
Participants. Initially, 330 students from several European
universities took part in this online experiment on a voluntary
basis. Of those, we retained data from 139 students (72 women,
aged M = 27.45 years, SD = 4.62) based on two criteria: That
participants were enrolled in a PhD program at that time and that
they had already submitted a scientific article for publication in a
peer-reviewed journal in their field.
Materials and Procedure. Participants were invited to take
part in a study about ‘‘work-related issues, affect and life
satisfaction during PhD’’, that took about 15 minutes to complete
and was administered online using SurveyMonkey. The study
advertisement targeted postgraduate students enrolled in a PhD
program, regardless of their research field.
Participants first answered background questions (age, gender,
whether they were currently preparing a PhD, the field of study)
and a question measuring current happiness (‘‘How happy would
you say you are these days?’’ 1 = not happy to 7 = extremely happy).
They then answered questions about their submitted articles
(‘‘Have you already submitted an article to a scientific journal?;
‘‘When have you submitted your last article?’’). Next, participants
were instructed to think about their last submitted manuscript and
to indicate: ‘‘How much would you say you have worked on this
article before you have submitted it?’’; ‘‘How much effort would
you say you have put into preparing this article for submission?’’,
and ‘‘How much time have you invested in preparing this article
for submission?’’ (Three items measuring effort: 1 = very little, 7 = a
lot). Further, we measured the potential mediator, the subjective
quality of the article (adapted from Kruger et al., 2004): ‘‘How
much would you say this article is original?’’; ‘‘How much would
you say this article is complex?’’, and ‘‘How much would you say
this article is well-written?’’ (for all three, 1 = not at all, 7 =
extremely). Participants indicated whether they were the first author
and the only author of the paper, when they expected the editorial
decision for, and how much scientific experience they had (‘‘Have
you already presented your research at conferences? - If yes, for
how many times?’’ and ‘‘Have you already published scientific
articles in peer-reviewed journals? - If yes, how many?’’). Finally,
we measured the affective prediction (adapted from [8]) with
‘‘How happy do you think you would be if your article were
accepted by the journal where you’ve submitted it?’’ (1 = not happy,
7 = extremely happy).
Results
Impact of effort on affective predictions. We created a
composite score for the ‘effort’ measure by averaging the three
items used to measure it (M = 5.79, SD = 1.16, a= 0.89). Analyses
were done using linear regressions. As predicted, the more effort
one had invested in preparing the manuscript, the happier one
thought s/he would be if the manuscript were accepted, b = .17,
SE = .08, t(137) = 2.11, p,.036, gp
2 = .03. This relationship did
not depend on current happiness (the effect remained significant,
p,.028, gp
2 = .03), on the time elapsed since the submission (p,
.03, gp
2 = .04), on the time remaining until the editorial decision
(p,.02, gp
2 = .05), neither on whether the participant was the first
or the only author of the manuscript (p,.04, gp
2 = .03 in both
cases).
We have also tested the exploratory research question that the
relationship between effort and affective prediction is qualitatively
different for people more experienced with the respective task (i.e.,
publishing manuscripts) than people less experienced with that
task. We created a composite score for ‘experience’ by averaging
the scores at the two items measuring it (‘‘Have you already
presented your research at conferences? - If yes, for how many
times?’’ and ‘‘Have you already published scientific articles in
peer-reviewed journals? - If yes, how many?’’), r(136) = .27, p,.01.
Most participants (84 out of 139) were completely inexperienced in
publishing manuscripts (their mean experience was zero). For
those inexperienced participants, the relationship between effort
and expected happiness approached significance, r(84) = .20,
p = .07. For the more experienced participants (with a mean
experience superior to 3.5), however, the results indicated that
effort was no longer related to expected happiness, r(55) = .14,
p = .31.
The ‘effort heuristic’ mechanism. We expected that the
effort invested in a task (the manuscript) would predict the
expected happiness because people associate higher effort with
higher quality outcomes. To test this mediation hypothesis, we first
created a composite score for the ‘subjective quality of the article’
by averaging the three items used to measure it (M = 4.81, SD
= 1.08, a= 0.70). Effort predicted subjective quality of the article,
b = .20, SE = .08, t(137) = 2.54, p,.01, gp
2 = .04, indicating that
the more effort one invested in preparing the manuscript, the
better quality one thought the manuscript would be. Second, we
tested whether subjective quality of the article predicted expected
happiness (controlling for effort), which was confirmed, b = .38, SE
= .08, t(136) = 4.44, p,.001, gp
2 = .12: The better quality one
estimated the article was, the happier one expected to feel if it were
accepted. And finally, when controlling for the influence of the
subjective quality of the article, effort no longer predicted expected
happiness, b = .10, SE = .08, t(136) = 1.26, p = .21, gp
2 = .01, Sobel
z = 2.37, p,.05 (Figure 1).
We have also investigated the mediation hypothesis using
bootstrapping analyses with 1000 samples [24], which revealed a
significant indirect effect of effort on expected happiness through
subjective quality of the article (LLCI = +.018, ULCI = +.123).
Discussion
Study 1 results confirmed our hypothesis about a positive
relationship between effort and affective predictions: The more
effort one declared having invested in an article, the happier one
predicted s/he would feel, if the article were accepted. We further
predicted that this affective forecasting effect would be mediated
by the subjective quality of the article. This prediction was also
supported: PhD students who estimated having invested relatively
more effort in preparing a manuscript thought their effort had led
to a higher-quality article, which led them to expect feeling
happier in case of success. This study is the first demonstration of
an effort-based affective forecasting effect and of the meditational
role of an effort heuristic.
One plausible alternative explanation for Study 1 results could
be the fact that if participants think their manuscript is good, they
would probably sent it to a good-quality academic journal.
Therefore, acceptance would have an objectively higher value for
these compared to those who sent their manuscript to a less good-
quality academic journal. We have no empirical data that would
allow us to examine this alternative account regarding Study 1
results. However, in Study 2, we attempt to demonstrate that the
relationship between effort and future affective predictions
depends on the effort heuristic, this time using an experimental
design and materials that are devoid of Study 1 limitations
discussed hereby.
Study 2
Study 2 was aimed at providing direct experimental evidence for
our hypothesis. We predicted that participants randomly assigned
to a high-effort condition would expect to feel happier if the task
Effort and Affective Predictions
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they engaged in (creating an advertising slogan) had succeeded
than participants assigned to a low-effort condition. Again, we
expected this affective forecasting effect to be mediated by the
subjective quality of the task. A second objective was to test the
notion that the ‘effort heuristic’ strategy can lead participants to
overestimate the quality of their outcome. Specifically, we
expected that although participants in the high-effort condition
would perceive their slogan as qualitatively better than participants
in the low-effort condition, no objective difference in quality between
these two conditions would actually be observed. This prediction,
if supported, would complement Krueger et al.’s [21] research in
showing that effort can become a cue for quality not only when
evaluating others’ work, but also when evaluating one’s own
outcomes.
Method
Participants. Thirty-five students (17 women, aged
M = 22.89 years, SD = 3.64) took part in this lab-based experiment
on a voluntary basis.
Materials and Procedure. Participants were invited to
participate in ‘‘a study on advertising and creativity’’. They were
given a scenario according to which a well-known national
advertising agency was launching a students’ contest, in which
participants could win a monetary prize and the opportunity to do
an internship in advertising within the agency. In order to win,
participants needed to create an advertising slogan for a product
supposedly included in the agency’s portfolio (an energy drink).
They were provided with the main features of the product (e.g.,
ingredients, caloric intake) and received instructions about how to
create the slogan, which represented the effort manipulation.
Participants in the high-effort condition were told to take all the time
they needed to think of an advertising slogan because ‘‘the ability
to generate ideas carefully is seen as crucial in order to work in this
agency’’. They were also instructed not to settle for the first slogan
that came to mind, but to generate as many slogans as possible and
to choose one of them only when they finished. Those in the low-
effort condition were told to think of a slogan as quickly as possible,
because ‘‘the ability to generate ideas rapidly is seen as crucial in
order to work in this agency’’. They were also instructed to settle
for the first slogan that came to mind.
Upon completion of this task, participants answered questions
measuring the variables of interest: Subjective quality of the slogan
they created (‘‘How much do you believe the slogan you have
created is interesting/good/original/attractive?’’ 1 = not at all, 7 =
extremely) and predicted happiness (‘‘How happy do you think you
would be if your slogan won the contest?’’ 1 = not happy; 7 =
extremely happy, adapted from [8]). We also measured perceived
effort (‘‘How much effort did you invest in creating your slogan?’’;
‘‘How much did you think before finding your slogan?’’, 1 = very
little, 7 = a lot) and perceived difficulty of the task (‘‘How difficult
did you find this task?’’ 1 = not at all, 7 = very difficult).
Results
Manipulation checks. We created a composite score for
‘perceived effort’ by averaging the scores of the two items
measuring it, r(34) = .79, p,.001. Participants in the high-effort
condition estimated they had invested more effort in creating the
slogan (M = 3.78, SD = 1.23) than participants in the low-effort
condition (M = 2.47, SD = 1.27), F(1, 33) = 9.60, p,01, gp
2 = .22.
As the high-effort (M = 3.50, SD = 1.10) and the low-effort
conditions (M = 3.06, SD = 1.98) did not differ in terms of
perceived difficulty (F,1), we excluded the possibility that the
effort manipulation had also introduced variations in perceived
difficulty of the task.
Impact of effort on affective predictions. As predicted,
ANOVAs revealed that participants in the high-effort condition
thought they would be happier if their slogan won the advertising
contest (M = 6.28, SD = 0.96) than those in the low-effort condition
(M = 4.76, SD = .30), F(1, 33) = 6.56, p,01, gp
2 = .16. This effect
remained significant when ‘current happiness’ was entered as
covariate, F(1, 33) = 6.62, p,01, gp
2 = .17.
The ‘Effort heuristic’ mechanism. We created a composite
score for the ‘subjective quality of the slogan’, by averaging the
four items used to measure it (M = 4.41, SD = 1.34, a= 0.92). To
test the mediation hypothesis, we used linear regressions and we
first tested whether the high-effort condition resulted in high
Figure 1. Mediation of the Effort - Affective Prediction (expected happiness) Relationship by Subjective Quality (Study 1). Values
represent unstandardized regression coefficients. The coefficient in parentheses represents the association between Effort and Affective Prediction
when Subjective Quality is not included in the model (* p,.05; ** p,.01; *** p,.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101512.g001
Effort and Affective Predictions
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subjective quality ratings of the slogan. This was indeed the case,
b = .45, SE = .22, t(33) = 2.06, p,.05, gp
2 = 11. Second, we tested
whether higher subjective quality predicted higher anticipated
happiness (controlling for effort), which was also confirmed,
b = .63, SE = .21, t(32) = 2.94, p,.01, gp
2 = .18. And finally, when
controlling for the influence of subjective quality of the slogan,
effort no longer predicted anticipated happiness, b = .48, SE = .28,
t(32) = 1.68, p = .10, gp
2 = 05, Sobel z = 1.80, p = .07 (compared
to the direct effect of effort on anticipated happiness, b = .76,
SE = 29, p,.05, gp
2 = 16, see Figure 2). Bootstrapping analyses
with 1000 samples [24] revealed a significant indirect effect of
effort on expected happiness through subjective quality of the
article (LLCI = +.02, ULCI = +.85).
Subjective vs. objective quality of the slogan. Participants
in the high-effort condition estimated their slogan was qualitatively
better (M = 4.84, SD = 1.06) than participants in the low-effort
condition (M = 3.95, SD = 1.48), F(1, 33) = 4.25, p,.05, gp
2 = .11.
We were interested in whether this difference between high- and
low-effort conditions reflected a biased evaluation (the ‘effort
heuristic’) or rather an objective difference in the quality of the
slogan. Thus, we asked 24 independent judges (14 women, aged
M = 21.03 years, SD = 3.51) to evaluate the quality of the slogans.
All judges were presented with the 35 slogans generated by
participants and were asked to rate them on several dimensions:
‘‘How much do you believe this advertising slogan is interesting/
good/original/attractive?’’ (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Next, we
created two scores for the objective quality of the slogan, one for
those created in the high-effort condition (a= 0.94) and one for
those created in the low-effort condition (a= 0.95). The former
were not judged as qualitatively better (M = 2.54, SD = 0.52) than
the latter (M = 2.48, SD = 0.58), F(1, 23) = 1.02, p = 32, gp
2 = .04,
which confirmed that effort inflated the subjective evaluations of
the slogan quality instead of leading to real, objective differences in
outcome quality.
Using an experimental design, Study 2 confirmed that
additional effort invested in a task elicits the feeling that one’s
work resulted in better outcomes, while not producing objectively
different outcomes. This subjective quality feeling, in turn,
increased one’s anticipated happiness in case of success.
General Discussion
In two studies we investigated whether effort invested in a task
increases one’s anticipated happiness if the task was successful.
Study 1 showed that the more effort a PhD student had invested in
preparing a manuscript for submission to a peer-reviewed journal,
the happier s/he predicts s/he would feel if the manuscript were
accepted for publication. Furthermore, Study 1 suggested that a
potential explanation for this relationship was the subjective
quality of the task: The more effort one estimates having invested
in a task, the more one expected the task outcome to be good,
which in turn increased anticipated happiness. Study 2 tested the
same hypotheses, this time using an experimental manipulation of
effort in the context of a different task: When working in high (vs.
low)-effort conditions, participants estimated they had produced
better outcomes, which in turn increased their predicted happi-
ness. Importantly, no objective difference in the quality of the task
outcomes accounted for this latter result. That is, participants
subjectively thought that the extra efforts they had engaged in the
task improved the quality of their work, while independent judges
had not observed any objective differences in quality between the
two conditions. Hence, effort inflated participants’ affective
prediction through overestimations of their work quality.
How can this effect be explained? According to the ‘effort
heuristic’ model, effort enhances the subjective value of outcomes
because it functions as a cue for estimating the quality of one’s
work [21]. Consequently, if people estimate their work to be
better, they may also expect positive affective consequences for
that work (one would generally prefer to have a good, rather than
an average manuscript accepted for publication). However, our
results go beyond the initial evidence for the ‘effort heuristic’
because a) they appeal to ‘effort heuristic’ to explain a relationship
between current effort and future affective predictions that was not
previously documented and b) they go beyond the current ‘effort
heuristic’ literature by showing that it occurs regarding effort one
has performed himself/herself, instead of someone else.
Effort heuristic is a parsimonious extension of the classic ‘‘effort
justification’’ account, according to which the effort one invests in
a task may carry out the meaning that the task is ‘‘more
Figure 2. Mediation of the Effort - Affective Prediction (expected happiness) Relationship by Subjective Quality (Study 2). Values
represent unstandardized regression coefficients. The coefficient in parentheses represents the association between Effort and Affective Prediction
when Subjective Quality is not included in the model (* p,.07; ** p,.05; *** p,.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101512.g002
Effort and Affective Predictions
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interesting’’ [19] in order to justify the cost of pursuing an effortful
goal. In other words, one would need to have invested high effort
into something in order to derive pleasure, likeness or happiness,
because this is part of the justification process. According to the
effort justification hypothesis [19] people might have logical
associations or naı̈ve scripts linking effort to quality and
anticipated happiness.
One could argue that our studies might have reinforced this
script because of the order in which the concepts were measured.
In Study 1 the causality of effort in determining the quality and,
subsequently, the predicted happiness could have been inferred by
the item order. In Study 2, where effort was manipulated, the
order was again consistent with the causal script. But recent data
collected in our laboratory refute this possibility: when participants
were asked to imagine the causal chain (people imagined their
effort, the predicted quality and affect) they expected higher
quality after high effort (which is consistent with the effort
heuristic), but they did not expect higher happiness. This suggests
that the causality of the effort cannot simply be inferred by order,
as people need to have experienced the effort in order to predict
their affect.
Whether effort is a simple heuristic that allows fast judgments
about one’s expected feelings, a shutter button for justification
processes or part of a naı̈ve script is a debate that cannot be solved
by our results alone. Instead, we point to an element so far ignored
in the affective forecasting literature (e.g., [25]): Namely, what
people do focus on when they predict their future emotions. We
suggest that the effort invested in a task matters when forming
affective forecasts, regardless of how accurate these forecasts might
be. Study 2 indeed suggests that the relationship between effort
and affective predictions is explained by one’s exaggerated
perception of the quality of one’s work, while there was no
objective difference in quality for works produced under high or
low effort conditions. We thus believe that the most interesting
question to be asked with regard to the impact of effort on affective
predictions is whether this relationship is functional or not, and in
what conditions one uses effort cues to estimate an emotional
future reward.
Functionality vs. perils of anticipated emotions shaped
by effort
How important are anticipated emotions for motivating current
behavior? This question has long been at the heart of motivation
and self-regulation research (e.g., [12]). The possibility that the
effort-affective predictions relationship is a motivated or functional
process is worth discussing. People may anticipate emotional
rewards from their actions because they estimate them as
qualitatively better, therefore expecting the best results to meet
their efforts. Effort may help people exaggerate the positive
consequences of their actions in terms of outcomes (success) and
affect (happiness) to motivate themselves to pursue with one
action. Moreover, because effort is a controllable aspect of
behavior, people should be more confident that positive conse-
quences would derive from effortful actions, which in turn may
motivate them to invest further efforts in these actions. For this
reason perceived effort should matter more than real effort and
should speak to the functionality of the relation described here. If
the same task is perceived as effortful by Person A and effortless by
Person B, only Person A will expect higher happiness in case of
success because this would motivate her to get involved in that
task. Recent literature (e.g., [26,27]) outlines precisely how subjective
judgments of temporal distance or emotions take precedence in
determining one’s motivation for future tasks or one’s judgments of
present tasks.
One might also consider how legitimate and normative it is that
more effort brings more happiness. This social justice explanation
[28] cannot be, at present, accounted for in our results, but future
research might find interesting to specify the conditions in which
more effort is associated with more reward. For example, some
[16] suggested that the effort-reward relationship is stronger the
less one has to contribute himself/herself to that task (e.g., a
teacher might expect the best school results with more effort, but a
pupil might expect the best results with little effort).
Effort seems to serve as a motivator because it inflates our
expectation to derive pleasure from our actions. However, this
possibility cannot ignore the important debate between pros (e.g.,
[29]) and cons of positive illusions and motivation. People prone to
self-enhancing biases progressively show disengagement from
academic tasks (e.g., decline in valuing their academic grades
over the years) and lower self-esteem and well being [30]. Because
effort can create false expectations about how good one has
performed or about how good one will feel when achieving future
goals, it may trigger disappointment if outcomes are unsuccessful
or disengagement from goal pursuit when one realizes his/her
predictions were wrong.
A last detail that is worth mentioning regards the finding
reported in the footnote. With additional analyses, we found that
among Study 1 participants, 60% were completely inexperienced
in publishing manuscripts and 40% were somewhat experienced.
By testing the relationship between effort and predicted happiness
separately for each of these sub-samples, we found that it
approached significance for those inexperienced, but not for those
somewhat experienced. This could indicate that both Studies 1
and 2 included a majority of inexperienced participants, both in
terms of publishing manuscripts or more creative tasks such as
creating a slogan. Thus, effort is related to affective prediction only
for people unfamiliar or inexperienced with the respective task.
We believe this possibility regarding the role of experience or
expertise is worth exploring in future research, but in the current
research we have decided to keep it as a footnote due to the post-
hoc nature of this analysis.
Limits and further research
The measures of predicted happiness used here were not
followed by measures of ‘‘real’’ happiness, as most affective
forecasting research does. However, in light of recent meta-
analyses [1], we know that people are generally inaccurate in an
absolute sense (i.e., they all expect to feel worse than they actually
will), but in a more relative sense they seem to be quite accurate
about their future feelings. Regarding our results, this means that
participants who declared having invested more effort and who
expected to feel the happiest will, eventually, feel happier than
others in case of success (but perhaps more disappointed in case of
failure).
Another limitation is that participants were only asked to
anticipate positive affect. However, we predict that effort would
shape anticipated negative affect in the same way. This is because
effort has an impact on the intensity of the affective response, and
not on the type or polarity of affective response. Research on
affective forecasting showed that people exhibit the same bias
(overestimate the intensity of their affect) regardless of whether the
event is positive (in which case people overestimate happiness) or
negative (in which case people overestimate sadness, e.g., [31]).
Related to the previous point, one could argue that the focus on
effort might have led participants to frame their affective forecast
in terms of not losing, instead of winning. This could occur
because rejection can be more painful when one has put much
effort into a manuscript or a slogan. Consequently, participants
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might have predicted their anticipated relief from not being
rejected rather than from their anticipated happiness. Research on
motivational states (e.g., regulatory focus, [32]) does indeed predict
differences in various aspects of goal pursuit, such as one’s affective
responses that accompany goal pursuit. Measuring people’s
motivational orientation (promotion, prevention) or directly
framing the situation as success seeking or failure avoidance might
moderate the type of affective response. However, the relation
between effort and the intensity of the affect (which is of interest
here) should be the same, regardless of the polarity of the affective
response (positive or negative).
The positive relationship between effort and predicted happi-
ness suggests that effort could induce other types of judgment
biases as well, such as durability, focalism, or misconstruction. For
example, effort may accentuate people’s propensity to focus on the
task or the event requiring the effort at the expense of other tasks,
when predicting their affective reactions [6]. The effort invested in
a future event also influences the perception of temporal distance
to that event, so that effortful events are perceived as happening
closer in time that effortless ones [26]. Moreover, temporally close
events seem to induce more intense emotions than temporally
distant events [27]. Taken together, these studies suggest that more
effort invested in a task may induce more intense emotions because
effortful events are perceived as temporally closer. An interesting
question is whether effort may have a similar impact on the
affective predictions in the case of negative emotions. A research
[33] showed that effort influences the intensity of regret and
disappointment. It would be provocative to show that effort is also
related to anticipated negative emotions. For example, effort may
make people aware of their defensive mechanisms, thus reducing
the immune neglect bias [34].
Coda
This research provides original evidence (1) that people rely on
effort invested in a task to predict how happy they would feel, if
successful. It also reveals that (2) this effort influence on affective
predictions is mediated by higher perceived quality of one’s work
and that (3) the latter assessments may be inflated. This work
extends previous research on how action-related cues – such as effort,
task investment, or the action’s current emotional intensity – shape
estimations of more volatile parameters, such as future emotions.
Effort inflates our affective predictions, which results either in
some priceless help for maintaining current actions or initiating
future ones, or in increased susceptibility to overestimate the
quality of one’s work and deception if outcomes are negative.
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